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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ELDON L. ANDERSON, dba
SILVER DOLLAR LOUNGE,
Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 15653
UTAH COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, YUKUS Y.
INOUYE, KARL R. LYMAN,
and KENNETH J. PINEGAR
as Commissioners,
Respondents.

-~~~TION FOR REHEARING AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW
.'CJ'~ POINTS OF AUTHORITY IN SUPPORT THEREOF

TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND TO THE ASSOCIATE
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH:
COME NOW the respondents in error, within twenty days
after the decision in the above-entitled case which this
Honorable Court rendered, vacating the judgment of the trial
Court, and respectfully submits this, Petition for Rehearing,
pursuant to and in accordance with Rule 76(e)(l) of the Rules
of Civil Procedure and for cause thereof shows:
1.

That this Court has overlooked and failed to apply

its own decision in Shaw v. Orem City, 117 Utah 288 (1950),
1
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which holds that the legislature intended the sale of light
beer to be regulated solely by the State Liquor Commission
and local authorities and further that a beer license constitutes no property interest but is merely a privilege conferred upon the licensee and subject to denial without
affording due process.

This has become a maxim of law ad-

hered to by this Court and the District Court throughout the
years.
2.

That this Court has impliedly held Sections 32-4-8

and 32-4-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, unconstitutional.
Without further clarification and specific treatment given by
this Court to these issues, the state of the law will remain
uncertain.
3.

That the opinion of this Court and the authorities

cited therein has created considerable question procedurally
as to whether or not this Court actually intended to vacate
the District Court's decision without remand or whether it
intended to vacate and remand for additional findings of fact.
By simply vacating without remand, the Court has taken away
the rights of Utah County to enforce health, fire,

and zoning

laws so far as they apply to the appellant in this case.

The

health and welfare of many residents of Utah County cannot
now be protected by the County because this Court has apparent~
removed the County's right so to do.
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4.

Utah County contends that although not required,

due process was afforded the appellant in this case, and requests this Honorable Court to remand for further findings
not inconsistent with the Court's ruling in favor of Utah
County.
WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that a rehearing be granted,
that the judgment of this Court heretofore entered on January
4, 1979, be vacated;

affirmed,

that the judgment of the trial Court be

and that the opinion of this Court be modified to

agree with the provisions of law and controlling authorities
set out in this Petition for Rehearing and in the accompanying
Brief of Authorities.

In the alternative, this Court should

at least remand for further findings or hearing to the trial

Cour~~etermine

whether or not the appellant was afforded

due process as claimed by petitioner.
Respectfully submitted this

2..f"-

day of

s.J8nulJ.ty

' 1979.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true

and correct copy of

Petition for Rehearing to Matt Biljanic, Attorney for Appellant,

7355 South 9th East, Midvale,
this

z.F

day of ., 2iJ./!" 'iV"f
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
A "CLASS B" BEER LICENSE IS NOT A "PROPERTY"
RIGHT AND NOT SUBJECT TO DUE PROCESS PROTECTION.
It is well settled that licenses issued for
the sale of intoxicating liquors or beverages have
no quality of a contract or of property, but are
merely temporary permits to do what otherwise
would be an offense against the law - that such a
license is a mere privilege to carry on a business
subject to the will of the grantor, and is not a
contract between the licensee and the government,
or property or vested right.
2 A.L.R.2d 1239
Section 3 at Page 1244.
32-4-8 U.C.A., 1953, reads as follows:
The Commission, without or without a hearing,
may at its discretion refuse to grant any license
or permit applied for, and may revoke any license
or permit at any time; and in no such case need any
cause be stated. The acts of the Commission in
giving or withholding consent or in granting, denying,
or revoking licenses or permits shall not be subject
to any review whatever, except in the cases in which
such action has been procured by fraud.
If at any
time a licensee or permittee shall cease to possess
all of the qualifications required by this act it
shall be the duty of the Commission to revoke his
license or permit.
All licenses and permits shall
have incorporated therein the statement that they
are granted subject to revocation as provided in
this act.
This same power has been delegated to city and county
commissions as a result of Section 32-4-17, cited Infra.
See Riggins v. District Court of Salt Lake City, 51 p.2d
645 (Utah).
In Shaw v. Orem City, 117 Utah 288 (1950), the Supreme
4
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Court ruled that the Legislature intended that the sale
of light beer be regulated solely by the State Liquor Commission and local authorities.

The Court indicated that a

beer license constitutes no property interest but is merely
a privilege conferred upon the licensee and subject, at the
will of the grantor, to denial without affording due process.
The Court relied on 46-0-131 U.C.A., 1943, (re-enacted
as 32-4-17 U.C.A., 1953) which reads in part as follows:
Cities and towns within their corporate
limits, and counties outside of incorporated
cities and towns shall have power to license,
tax, regulate or prohibit the sale of light
beer, at retail, in bottles or draft . . . .
[emphasis added.].
In writing for the majority, Justice McDonough stated:
That the state may prohibit the sale of
liquors is too well settled to
require\\citation of authority.
int~~ting

* * *
The power conferred is to 'license, tax, re~ulate
or prohibit' the sale of light beer at retail . . .
It seems to us patent that since a city may proh1b1t,
it may elect not to prohibit but to perm~t, un~er
such conditions or restrictions as the discretion
of its governing authority may dictate, subject,
of course, to conformity with state law. 214 P.2d
at 890.
At Page 807 of the Northwest Reporter, Second Series,
the Iowa Supreme Court in Smith v. Iowa Liguor Control Commission,

169 N.W.2d 803 (Iowa 1969), stated:
5
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The right of a legislature to provide, without
notice or hearing, for revocation of licenses, or
permits for the sale of beer is so well established
that it seems hardly debatable.
Constitutional
questions of due process and taking of property without
compensation have been repeatedly answered by the
statement that a license to . . . sell . . . beer,
. . . is a privilege granted by the state and is in
no~~ property right.
Such a license doe"S"""not
constitute a contract with the state or with the
municipality or other governing body which the state
empowers to issue it.
When the licensee takes this
privilege, he does so subject to the provisions of
the statutes under which it is granted; and that
these statutes say or fairly imply that he is entitled to no notice or hearing before revocation,
he cannot be heard to complain if he is given none.
[emphasis added.]
In disposing of the petitioners' contention that a beer
license constitutes a property right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court in Smith, supra, continued:
[W]hen a business is inherently illegal a
permit to operate may be granted or refused at the
will of the licensing body, is a privilege rather
than a property right, and may be revoked without
notice or hearing.
169 N.W.2d at 807.
For additional authority on point see Central States
Theatre Corporation v. Sar, 66 N.W.2d 450 (Iowa); State ex.
rel. Garrett v. Randall, 527 S.W.2d 366 (Missouri 1975);
Plumb v. Christie, 30 S.E. 759 (Georgia 1898); Tammaro v.
Bruckman, 18 N.Y.S.2d 689 (New York 1939).
POINT II
A FORMER HOLDER OF A LIQUOR LICENSE
IS NOT ENTITLED TO A PREFERENCE OVER
NEW APPLICANTS WHEN PETITIONING FOR A
LIQUOR LICENSE RENEWAL.
6
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This Court,

in the majority opinion handed down in

the case at bar, cited Charles D. Kaier Co. v. Doran, 42
F.2d 923 (E.D. Pennsylvania 1930), as authority for the
proposition that administrative discretion in refusing the
renewal of a liquor license is not so broad as in refusing
an application made for the first time.

At Page 2 of the

opinion, Justice Crockett, writing for the majority, stated,
"There are respected authorities which affirm the proposition
that the administrative body (the County Commission here)
should not have the same breadth of discretion in refusing
the renewal of the license of an operating business as it
would in passing on an application for the establishment of
a new business."

Th'e opinion of the Court as expressed by

Justice,'frockett appears to be contrary to the great weight
of auth~ty as expressed in 45 Am. Jur.2d, Intoxicating
Liquors, Section 175, wherein it reads:
Proceedings for the renewal or reissuance of
a liquor license are governed by the same rules
which would apply if the application were made for
the first time.
That is, the same discretion as
that vested in the licensing authorities with
respect to the original granting of a liquor license
exists with reference to renewals.
This view as expressed by Am. Jur. above, has been substantiated by numerous respected authorities.

See Quitt v.

Stone, 39 F.2d 219 (DC Md. 1930), affirmed 46 F.2d 405
(CA4th 1931); Paron v. Shakopee, 32 N.W.2d 603 (Minnesota 1948 );
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Zicherman v. Driscoll, 45 A.2d 630 (N.J. 1946), and Restaurants and Patisseries Longchamps v. O'Connell, 68 N.Y.S.2d
298 (1947), aff'd without opinion 296 N.Y. 888 (1947).

There

appears to be no authority (outside Pennsylvania) for the
proposition that one who applies for renewal of a license is
in favored position over one who applies for initial license.
In Howard v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 508 P.2d
819 (Or. App. 1973), the Liquor Control Commission (Commission)
denied petitioner's application for the renewal of a Class C
Retail Malt Beverage License for a tavern.

The petitioner

cited Charles D. Kaier Company v. Doran, supra, and argued
that his application was entitled to preferential treatment
as a renewal.

The Commission relied on ORS 471.301(1) which

reads in part as follows:
A license granted by the Liquor Control Act shall:

* * *
(c) be renewable in the manner provided in ORS
471.290 except for a cause which would be grounds for
refusal to issue such license under ORS 471.295 . . .
In addition 471.290(1) states:
Any person desiring a license or renewal of a
license shall make application to the County Commission . . . . No license shall be granted or renewed
until the provisions of the Liquor Control Act and
the regulations of the Commission have been complied
with.
In Howard, supra, the Court rejected the petitioner's
8
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argument and ruled that Charles D. Kaier Company v. Doran,
supra, would fail,

even if good law, "because of the express

language of the above statutes."

508 P.2d at 820.

At the

time Kaier v. Doran, supra, was decided there appeared to be
no Pennsylvania statute similar to ORS 471.290.
In the instant case, it is the contention of the petitioner (County Commission) that Charles D. Kaier Company v.
Doran, supra, as cited by the majority in their decision is
inapplicable, as it was in the Oregon case, because of the
express language of 32-4-8 U.C.A. (1953), cited earlier.
Although Section 32-4-8 fails to expressly concern itself with liquor license renewals, the Utah statute is unargua'b~

broad enough to include liquor license renewals.

32-4-8 p~vides that the Commission may "at its discretion"

...._,.

refuse to grant "any license" at "any time" without cause.
The above-cited enabling statute is clearly void of any
legislative intent which would lead one to believe that persons petitioning for liquor license renewals are to be given
preferential treatment over new applicants.
intent of the Legislature,

In fact, the

from the fact of the statute, is

surely contrary to any such interpretation.

See also ~

v. Wayne, 135 N.W. 457 (Michigan, 1911).
In addition,

in the instant case the majority opinion

suggests that principles of "reasonableness and justice"

9
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require the County Commission to afford special consideration
to petitioners for liquor license renewals when, "one reflects
on the practicalities of the situation where the business has
been established and operating for some years and thus represents a substantial commitment in the time, effort and
expense by the owner."
1979), at Page 2.

U.2d

, (No. 15653, January 4,

The law is well settled that the appellant

is charged with constructive knowledge as to the contents
of Section 32-4-8 and is presumed to realize that any renewal
is based solely on the discretion of the license granting
authority.

The fact that the retail liquor industry is heavily

regulated and that a Class B beer license must be renewed yearly,
are clear indications that the Class B beer retailer voluntarily assumes a risk that the license may be revoked or a
renewal application refused regardless of cause.

To hold

otherwise would allow the retailer to plead ignorance of the
law as a defense to any license revocation or renewal denial.
The expectancy of maintaining a licensed status beyond current
license term is not properly within the meaning of Article
1, Section 7 of our Constitution.

A licensee is not justified

in making investments dependent on renewals.
POINT I II
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THIS COURT FINDS
10
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THAT A CLASS B BEER LICENSE CONSTITUTES
A PROPERTY INTEREST REQUIRING DUE PROCESS
PROTECTION, THE COURT SHOULD REMAND THE CASE
FOR ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT RATHER THAN
TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT.
Tha language used; the format employed; and the authority
cited in the majority opinion in the instant case, has
created considerable question as to whether or not this Court
actually intended to vacate the District Court's decision
without remand or whether or not it intended to vacate and
remand for additional findings of fact.

At Page 2 of the

majority opinion the Court stated:
We agree with the plaintiff's contention that
the foregoing are not really 'findings of fact' but
are simply recitals of procedure and do not constitute
f1:ings, as required by Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P., which
pr wides:
In all actions tried upon the facts
without a jury . . . ' the court shall find
the facts specially and state separately
its conclusions of law thereon . . . .
[emphasis added.]
It is true that we indulge the presumption of
regularity in the proceedings before the trial court.
But this does not suffice when the record itself
exposes essential deficiencies. With certain exceptions, not applicable here, the just-quoted rule must
be complied with and a judgment cannot stand unless
there are findings which will justify it. 1
The failure of the trial court to enter adequate
findings requires that the judgment be vacated.
In so
ruling, it is appropriate that we make some observa~
.
tions regarding the plaintiff's claim that the Commission
acted arbitrarily and capriciously.2 Silver Dollar Lounge
v. Utah County Board of County Commissioners,
U.2d
, (No. 15653, January 4, 1979).
11
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Footnote 1 of the instant case cites LeGrand Johnson
Corporation v. Peterson, 18 U.2d 260, 420 P.2d 615 (1966)
and cases therein cited.

Footnote 2 reads as follows:

That it is our duty to pass on matters which
may become material when a case is remanded for
further proceedings, see Rule 76(a), U.R.C.P.;
LeGrand Johnson Corporation v. Peterson, supra, note 1.
Silver Dollar Lounge v. Utah County Board of County
Commissioners,
U.2d
, (No. 15653, January 4,
1979).
The Court cited the following language but failed to
remand the instant case.

Nevertheless the Court proceeded

to pass upon and determine questions of law necessary to
adjudicate the matter on remand to the District Court.
LeGrand Johnson Corporation v. Peterson, supra, was an
equitable action, as is the case at bar, to enforce an alleged
agreement to convey certain mining interests from the defendant
to the plaintiff.

The Court found that no findings of fact

were made and vacated the judgment and remanded the case for
a determination of facts on the material issues in dispute.
The Court continued:
Having concluded that it is necessary to
remand this case for further proceedings, it is
our duty to pass on matters which may then become
material.
[emphasis added.] 420 P.2d 615, 617.
Rule 76(a), U.R.C.P. reads in part:
The Supreme Court may reverse, affirm or
modify any order or judgment appealed from
If a new trial is granted, the Court shall pass
12
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upon and determine all questions of law involved
in the case resented u on the a eal and necessar
to the final determination of the case. emphasis
added.
One would gather, at least from the face of the opinion,
that this Court in Silver Dollar Lounge v. Utah County Board
of County Commissioners, ~- U.2d ~-' (No. 15653, January 4,
1979), fully intended to vacate and remand and merely vacated
the decision of the District Court inadvertently.
Notwithstanding the above, in Doe v. Doe, 158 P. 781
(Utah, 1916), the plaintiff brought an equitable action for
divorce on the ground of cruelty.

The District Court dismissed

the complaint and plaintiff appealed.

On appeal the Utah

Supreme Court held that the findings of fact were wanting and
revers~and

remanded.

The Court in Doe stated:

We have, heretofore, many times referred to
t e statute requiring specific and direct findings
of ltimate facts on all the material issues and
a separate statement of conclusions of law, and
held that, until there are findings of all the
material issues raised by the pleadings, the
findings are insufficient to support the judgment
We thus have a case where we are required to
either remand it for specific findings on all the
material issues, or ourselves try it de novo on the
record and make our direct findings, before any
question of law can be considered or any con~lusion
reached either on the law or facts.
[emphasis added.]
158 P. at 783.
Where inadequate findings of fact constitute the basis
for reversal, an exhaustive search into Utah case law has
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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failed to produce a single case wherein the Utah Supreme
Court has merely vacated without remanding the case or deciding the case on its merits de novo.
Notwithstanding, it is the contention of the respondent
Commission that the more appropriate remedy in the instant
case, as it was in the case of LeGrand Johnson Corporation v.
Peterson, supra, and cited by this Court in their majority
opinion, is remand to the District Court for adequate findings
of fact as to material issues rather than to vacate, and would
request the Court to modify the disposition of the case
accordingly.
CONCLUSION
A rehearing should be granted and the judgment of
this Court heretofore entered on January 4, 1979, should be
vacated.

The judgment of the trial Court should be affirmed,

and the opinion of this Court should be modified to agree
with the provisions of law and controlling authorities set
out in this Petition for Rehearing and accompanying Brief
of Authorities.

In the alternative, this Court should at

least remand for further findings or hearing to the trial
Court to determine whether or not the appellant was afforded
due process as claimed by petitioner.

14
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